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Abstract
Radicalization of youth is becoming one of the most 
important threats to national and international security 
in the world today. Socially isolated, disenchanted 
young men turn to extremism in their search for 
identity, acceptance and purpose. Radicalization is 
a process by which an individual or group comes to 
adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious 
ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status 
quo or reject and or undermine contemporary ideas 
and expressions of freedom of choice. Radicalization 
is therefore seen as the process that leads to violence 
which, in the final analysis is what distinguishes a 
terrorist from other extremists. This process occurs over 
time and causes a fundamental change in how people 
view themselves and the world in which they live. In 
Nigeria, the problem of youth radicalization is rising and 
very few attempts have been made toward understanding 
this problem. Hence, the exact ature of this process is 
still misunderstood with researchers having developed 
a number of different theories and conceptual models 
that seek to explain the process. This paper addresses the 
phenomenon of youth radicalization and its implication 
for the future of terrorism in Nigeria. 
Key words: Radicalization; Counter-terrorism; 
United States; Youth; Future implication; Community 
engagement
Stephen, E. N. (2016). Youth Radicalization and the Future of 
Terrorism in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, 12(10), 42-50. Available 
from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/8873 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/8873
INTRODUCTION
Since the return of democracy into the country, Nigeria 
has experienced an upsurge in violent conflicts and 
criminality. The violence and criminality have come in 
the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, 
arms smuggling, human trafficking and militancy among 
others. Particularly worrisome is the fact that this threat 
of terrorism no longer solely comes from foreign centrally 
organized groups like Al Qaida, Hezbollah or Jamaah 
Islamiyah but from home grown terrorists. Nigeria’s 
internal security has been significantly undermined by 
violent activities of armed non-state actors, largely made 
up of radicalized youth groups as foot soldiers. These 
violent groups have leveraged on the vulnerability of 
the Nigerian youth to deepen their process and drive for 
recruitment and radicalisation. 
Many believe that the sympathizers of the group are 
mostly disaffected and unemployed youths who live in 
hostile environment, with challenges spanning economic, 
social and political deprivations. 
However, the recent profiles of terrorists suggest that 
they are not the stereotyped, impoverished and uneducated 
youths as was generally presumed. Instead they are the 
progeny of years of frustrated political aspirations and 
indignity, which inculcates an acute sense of insecurity 
and consequent hatred against those who are perceived to 
have brought about these conditions.
Radicalization of youth is becoming one of the most 
serious threats to international terrorism in the world 
today. Socially secluded, dissatisfied young men turn to 
extremism in their search for identity, acceptance and 
Purpose (Bizina, 2014). 
While youth involvement in extremism and violence 
may be caused by social and economic circumstances in 
which the youths find themselves, the avenues through 
which they get recruited into such violence are necessary 
for understanding restiveness. Understanding how people 
get persuaded to become members of militants or terrorist 
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organizations is critical in the design and development 
of counter-terrorism measures, and without members, 
terrorist organizations cannot exist. Appreciating how 
and why an individual is radicalized and recruited 
into a terrorist organization therefore form the basis 
for addressing the problem. The individual level is 
where terrorism begins. It is the individual who keeps 
the organization operational and helps perpetuate the 
organization’s ideology. It is therefore important 
to know what causes an individual to embrace 
terrorism. It is more helpful to supplement such profiles 
with examinations of recruitment patterns. In Nigeria, 
Radicalisation has been identified to be acquired through 
a variety of sources. The study aims at providing a better 
understanding of the issues involved and examine the 
problem of Youths radicalization in Nigeria and the 
future of terrorism in the country. The study therefore 
aimed at examining the following objectives: 
a) Provide an empirical understanding of the 
mechanisms, catalysts and dynamics of the radicalisation 
process in Nigeria. 
b) Examine the motivations that lead to youth 
recruitment into terrorist groups in Nigeria. 
c) Examine the process of youths radicalisation and the 
future of terrorism in Nigeria.
1. RADICALISATION: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The concept of radicalisation has gained significant 
currency in use by government officials,  media 
practitioners, scholars and security officials in discourses 
on terrorism and violent extremism. It is appropriate to 
clarify the way it is understood and applied to this study, 
before delving into the diverse discursion. There is no 
single definition of the term that is generally agreed upon 
by its diverse users. As Schmid has rightly noted, “the 
terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘de-radicalisation’ are used 
widely, but the search for what exactly ‘radicalisation’ is, 
what causes it and how to ‘de-radicalise’ those who are 
considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists, is a 
frustrating experience” (Schmid, 2013, p.1). Ashour, for 
instance, posits that radicalisation is
a process of relative change in which a group undergoes 
ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to 
the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful 
alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and 
political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, 
or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political 
goals. (Ashour, 2009, p.4) 
For Sodipo, radicalisation is 
a process by which an individual or group adopts extreme 
political, social, or religious ideals that reject the status quo, 
undermine contemporary ideas regarding freedom of choice and 
expression, and condone violence to achieve ideological ends, 
including undertaking terrorist acts. (Sodipo, 2013, p.4) 
It  typically starts with changes in one’s self-
identification. Grievances, frequently driven by personal 
or group concerns regarding local issues as well as 
international events, fuel this change. In the view of 
Schmid, radicalisation entails: An individual or collective 
(group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political 
polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise 
and tolerance between political actors and groups with 
diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides 
in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to 
engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These 
can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure 
and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence 
other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in 
the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on 
the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an 
ideological socialization away from mainstream or status 
quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist 
positions involving a dichotomous world view and the 
acceptance of an alternative focal point of political 
mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the 
existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or 
legitimate (Schmid, 2013, p.18). 
Although there is no unanimity among scholars on the 
definition of the term, analysts are almost in agreement 
that radicalisation is a process. Factors that engender the 
radicalisation of individuals or groups have remained a 
subject of debate among experts. It has been argued that 
the causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are 
abundant. In other words, experts believe that there is no 
single factor that leads an individual or even a group to 
become radicalized, but rather, it is the complex overlap of 
concurring and mutually reinforcing factors (see Evans & 
Neumann, 2009; Kirby, 2007; Ferrero, 2005; Stern, 2003). 
To this end, a study on causal factors of radicalisation 
concludes that a complex interaction between factors 
at three levels – individual, external and social—is 
likely to be crucial for the intensity of the readiness for 
radicalisation (Danish Institute for International Studies, 
2008). External factors manifest themselves independent 
of the individual. They shape and constrain people’s 
environment, but individuals have only minor influence 
on their environment. External factors can be subdivided 
into political, economic and cultural dimensions. Social 
factors refer to mechanisms that position the individual in 
relation to relevant others and hence can include people 
from in-groups as well as out-groups. 
Wiktorowitcz has identified four interrelated stages of 
the radicalisation process as follows: i) cognitive opening 
whereby individuals conditioned by both internal and 
external factors like economic and social circumstances 
become receptive to new ideas; ii) religious seeking 
during which individuals seek religious understanding 
of the issues; iii) frame alignment where the new ideas 
which are often radical in nature become meaningful 
to them, and iv) Socialisation during which individuals 
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internalize radical ideas that enable them to join extremist 
groups (Beutel, 2007). This process may not entirely 
explain the circumstances for all radicalized people and 
Islamic groups but certainly illuminates how youths get 
radicalized in the West and other parts of the world. 
These factors can manifest in different forms 
depending on the individual and context. However, 
agreement tends to revolve around a broad set of 
parameters that act as ingredients in the radicalisation 
process: grievance, ideology, mobilisation, and tipping 
points. While grievance is understood to be the sense of 
alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive 
opening, ideology entails the extreme set of ideas 
that provides the individual with a new outlook and 
explanation for the world an individual finds him or 
herself. Mobilisation captures the process by which 
the individual is slowly integrated into a community 
of individuals who are like-minded and create a self-
reinforcing community, and finally, tipping points are 
the specific events that push an individual or group from 
rhetoric to action (Beutel, 2007). External forces can also 
facilitate and reinforce these factors. While these varying 
definitions and explanatory frameworks illuminate our 
understanding of radicalisation, it is important to bear in 
mind that what attracts young people to radical behaviour 
differs from person to person with the most important 
being the individual factor. As experts have argued, “the 
part to radicalisation is a highly individualised one, with 
very different characteristics from a person to person” 
(Vidino, Pantucci, & Kohlmann, pp.201-230). According 
to the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 
radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it can 
occur very rapidly, has not specifically defined beginning 
or end-state (Danish Institute for International Studies, 
2008, p.6). Rather, radicalisation is an individual 
development that is initiated by a unique combination 
of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in 
attitudes and behaviour. 
This study, therefore, defines radicalisation as defined 
by Cleen foundation 2014 as the process by which 
an individual or group transits from a state of passive 
reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, 
ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such 
views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, 
promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving 
such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent 
extremism or terrorism. In the light of the foregoing, the 
critical challenge is to uncover the reason young people 
are inclined to be part of insurgent groups in Nigeria.
2 .  T H E O R E T I C A L  F R A M E W O R K : 
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY 
In understanding the causes that motivate individuals 
into terrorism, it is important first to understand relative 
deprivation as a theory of political violence. Gurr explains 
that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a 
gap between expected and achieved welfare creates 
collective discontent. This theory also applies to 
individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior 
to that of others with whom they compare themselves. 
Gurrargues that relative deprivation is a term used to 
denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy 
between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value 
satisfaction. The concept of relative deprivation dates 
back to ancient Greece. Aristotle articulated the idea 
that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of 
inequality, rather than an absolute measure. For Aristotle, 
the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for 
economic or political equality on the part of the common 
people who lack it, and the aspiration, Gurr states that 
perceived discrepancy between value expectations and 
value capabilities is what leads to discontent, not the 
millionaire’s absolute economic standing. 
Gurrfurther explains that the primary source of 
the human capacity for violence appears to be the 
frustration—aggression mechanism—the anger induced 
by frustration—is a motivating force that disposes men 
to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.” 
However, Gurr was not the first  in his field to 
propose a link between frustration and aggression. 
Dollard (1939) and others were the first to propose 
the theory, postulating that frustration leads men to 
act aggressively. Accordingly, frustration is caused by 
relative deprivation, and the resulting aggression is 
manifested as terrorism. 
The hypothesis is therefore that levels of terrorism 
may be explained in part as an expression of country 
conditions conducive to relative deprivation. To 
examine this theory empirically, one examines whether 
high unemployment rates, dependent on there also 
being higher rates of enrollment in tertiary education, 
are positively correlated with terrorism. When a large 
group of highly educated individuals enter the work 
force at low levels, they may feel over-qualified and 
disappointed relative to what they expected to gain from 
their education. Presumably individuals pursue higher 
education with the expectation that additional studies 
or training will help them find better jobs. As a result, 
well-educated individuals may feel greater discontent 
from unemployment than those who did not expect 
such employment opportunities. This socioeconomic 
discontent, in turn, may result in political violence. While 
individual economic indicators alone do not appear to 
be strongly correlated with terrorism, the interaction 
effect of an economic variable (unemployment) and a 
social variable (education) may provide better insight into 
understanding terrorism.
Quantitative studies of terrorism have increased 
dramatically in the past decade. Many articles in this 
body of literature sought to explain terrorism as the 
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result of poor economic development and lack of 
education in a country. However, it soon became clear 
that this is not the case. Krueger and Malecková argue 
that eradication of poverty and universal secondary 
education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, 
those who are well-off and well-educated may even 
perceive such feelings more acutely. In fact, terrorists 
tend to be better-educated and wealthier individuals than 
average. Azam also notes that, the emerging picture 
is that terrorists are men and women in their twenties 
with some post-secondary training, mostly in technical 
or engineering education. For example, biographies 
of Al-Qaeda members recorded by Sageman reveal 
that they are generally highly educated, mostly in 
scientific or technical disciplines. More recent studies 
of terrorism have focused on individual determinants 
rather than any interaction effect of economic and social 
variables. 
Relatively, Li and Schaub, examine whether economic 
globalization increases or decreases transnational terrorist 
incidents inside countries. Globalization may be tied 
closely to relative deprivation, in the sense that greater 
access to information about people in other countries 
increases awareness of one’s relative world view. Li and 
Schuab hypothesize that increased globalization leads to 
greater levels of international terrorism because trade 
makes it easier for terrorists to mobilize and move 
materials that they eventually use to carry out attacks 
across borders. 
Krueger and Malecková’s finding on the connection 
between education, poverty, and terrorism confirm 
the core assumption that terrorists tend to be better 
educated and from wealthier backgrounds. They find 
that Palestinian suicide bombers are less likely to come 
from impoverished families and more likely to have 
completed high school and attended college than the rest 
of the Palestinian population. They also find that poverty 
is inversely related with whether someone becomes 
a Hezbollah member, and education is positively 
correlated with whether someone becomes a Hezbollah 
member, suggesting that wealthier,  more highly 
educated people are more likely to join this particular 
terrorist organization. Another scholar, Johan Galtung 
says that “feelings of deprivation arise when one has 
inconsistent rankings; that is, high education but low 
salary. 
Many results from studies provide some evidence 
that within countries where there are recorded attacks, 
the interaction between unemployment and higher 
education may be an important indicator. This could 
suggest that while the effect is not significant enough 
to drive individuals in a nation to the point of terrorism, 
in countries where there is already terrorist activity, an 
increase in these conditions could further increase the 
incidence of terrorism. 
3. YOUTH AND RADICALIZATION INTO 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A PRELIMINARY 
PSYCHOSOCIAL ANALYSIS
Why are youth so heavily represented amongst militants 
radicalized? While some argue that the role of social 
media is crucial in understanding how youths attracts 
today’s tech savvy youth, in reality the Internet, 
though not unimportant, is merely an accelerant of the 
radicalization process (Homeland Security Institute, 
2009, p.6). What makes youth vulnerable actually reside 
off-line in a real world context; nevertheless, insights 
from several disciplines offer us some preliminary 
answers.
3.1 Neurological Factors
To start with, neurologically youth is pretty unique as their 
brain development proceeds in a rather uneven fashion. 
Specifically, during the teenage years the prefrontal 
cortex that guides reasoning and self-control develops 
more gradually than the amygdala—the center of human 
emotions. This helps explain why teenagers between 18 
and 20 years of age often appear to many an exasperated 
parent as impulsive and rash (Leong, 2011). Second, the 
amygdala-driven and rather intense emotional turbulence 
that many teens more or less experience at regular 
intervals is not without implications. It suggests a certain 
psychological instability that expresses itself frequently 
in a quest for absolute cognitive certainty—which violent 
fundamentalist groups like ISIS conveniently appear to 
offer. In sum, youth is anything but regular folk: They are 
actually in a “tumultuous biological, cognitive, social and 
emotional transition to adulthood” (Ramakrishna, 2015, 
p.116). It is precisely this process of transition that renders 
youth to be akin to psychological putty in the hands of 
skilled extremist ideologues.
3.2 The Family Context
The essential psychological vulnerability of youth arising 
from neurological factors is further influenced by the 
immediate family context. British psychiatrist Russell 
Razzaque in this respect has argued that the “the initial 
parental bond” is utterly crucial for the healthy emotional 
development of youth (2008, pp.80-83). He asserts that 
“just as oxygen deprivation can impair growth or cause 
damage to the unborn child, so lack of attachment and 
emotional deprivation can harm the growing infant and 
stunt his psychological development”. Razzaque warns 
that a youth growing up without a stable role model 
in the immediate family context “will see things in a 
very different light from the way adults do, even as he 
grows older”. Psychologically speaking, it has long been 
understood that “our personality, character, thoughts, and 
feelings are shaped by our early childhood experiences”, 
and central to the process of ego and identity formation 
until even well into adulthood is as noted the “early 
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and influential parent-child dyad” (Jones, 2008, 
p.119). Hence those youth who, because of a deeply 
dysfunctional relationship with early parental figures, 
possess “fragile senses of identity and unhealthily 
developed egos”, they would lack the utterly important 
“inner strength and personal stability required to endure 
life’s ordinary trials and tribulations” (Alper, 2006, 
pp.173-4). A weak and/or dysfunctional immediate 
family context, therefore, could well render a youth 
“desperately hungry” for “external objects that claim 
to be perfect and ideal”, and that supposedly offer “that 
necessary sense of connection to something of value” 
that can “buttress his self-esteem” (Jones, 2008, pp.133-
4). This is the point where for instance Boko Haram 
extremist ideologues can strike home with their social 
media appeals. The adverse impact of a poor family 
background is no exaggeration. In Saudi Arabia as one 
instance, it was found that many who had grown up 
in homes of relatives “without their parents present” 
were in need of attention, as their “personal and social 
problems” appeared to “contribute to radicalization” 
(International Peace Institute, 2010, p.9).
3.3 The Social Milieu
Another factor that plays an instrumental role in at 
times rendering youth susceptible to extremist appeals 
for example is the wider social milieu within which 
they and their immediate families are embedded. Of 
special concern are Muslim communities or sub-cultures 
that are relatively insulated from the wider polity and 
have been beset by a range of political, historical and 
socioeconomic setbacks that have generated a sense of 
alienation vis-a-vis dominant out-groups. In some cases, 
such “countercultures” —not just in the Middle East but 
including poorly integrated migrant communities—may 
share a generalized perception that their communities are 
facing political and socioeconomic marginalization—or 
worse (Juergensmeyer, 2000, p.12). In a broadly similar 
way, the aforementioned training camps for children 
Boko Haram has apparently set up can be considered 
as seminal “cultures of violence”, that are “a crucial 
part of understanding religious terrorism” (Jones, 2008, 
p.120). Youth that is immersed in their formative years 
in such stressed communities rarely emerge unscathed. 
From a neurological perspective, growing up immersed 
in a counter cultural milieu characterized by interactions 
and experiences that heighten out-group prejudice has a 
significant impact on their highly plastic youthful brains. 
Specifically, within the hippocampus, a part of the ancient 
limbic system of the brain, strong emotional reactions 
to experiences of social and economic discrimination or 
worse at the hands of out-groups—as well as repeated 
exposure to negative out-group stereotyping—cannot 
but be stored as long-term memory (Johnson, 2004, p.8; 
Wilson, 1999, pp.116-17; Newberg & Waldman, 2006, 
p.32).
Freud elaborated on this process with his concept of 
so-called critical periods. During such periods, the unique 
architecture of a youth’s hippocampus stabilizes in a 
relatively enduring way. Hence when such critical and 
brief windows close, the youth’s learned habits, beliefs 
and attitudes become relatively resistant to change; put 
another way, once certain neural pathways are laid down, 
they become entrenched (Doidge, 2008, pp.52-3); (Ridley, 
2004, pp.167-70). In essence, therefore, youth who come 
of age within cultures of hatred “tend to be self-righteous, 
prejudicial and condemnatory toward people outside their 
groups”, whilst possessing an especially pronounced “us 
versus them’ mentality that many will carry throughout 
their lives”— shaped in no small part as well by “the 
stories” they have “heard and read while growing up” 
(Newberg & Weldman, 2006, p.121).
The Middle East offers one illustration of how 
culturally sanctioned out-group prejudice can be 
socialized into youth: “Hatred for Jews and Zionists” is 
widespread in the mainstream and social media and even 
in textbooks for children as young as three years old, 
“complete with illustrations of Jews with monster-like 
qualities”. In short, Jews are painted as “bloodsuckers 
who attack the Palestinians” (Ali, 2013, p.37). Not 
entirely surprising perhaps then that in one Palestinian 
refugee camp in the Gaza Strip a Hamas official informed 
the terrorism scholar Scott Atran in 2004 that “our youth 
are running into martyrdom” (Atran, 2010, p.353). 
So generalized and pervasive was the counter culture 
hatred of Israelis that one young man very matter-of-
factly discussed with Atran the “costs and benefits of a 
roadside versus suicide bombing”, a topic that appeared 
normal within the “group’s moral frame” (2010, p.355). 
Even more remarkable was the little boy kicking a frayed 
soccer ball near the border crossing at Bayt Lahiyah who 
assured Atran that “he wanted to die a shahed, killing 
Israelis” (2010, p.356). It is thus not hard to see how 
immersion in a counter-culture milieu characterized by 
deep out-group hatred and prejudice can—in tandem 
with the neurological, psychological and family factors 
just discussed—erode the ability of youth to withstand 
the siren call of violent extremist ideologues, like those 
that currently promote the seductive ISIS narrative across 
various social media platforms.
3.4 Poor Education System 
The situation could be marked by a poor education 
system stratified along socio-economic lines and 
disparate economic opportunities across segments of 
society. Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation 
of mainly educated youth represents a danger zone. 
Moreover, perceptions of social exclusion and marginality 
in an environment of a youth bulge are seemingly a recipe 
for radicalization. These are warning signals that could 
increase the likelihood for young members of society 
being lured towards extremist causes. Most importantly, 
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the presence of an extremist infrastructure, the impeccable 
organizational discipline and widespread social networks 
of Somalia are factors that influence the youth or make 
them vulnerable to manipulation. Islamic political 
and militant outfits, a failure of the moderate forces to 
deliver credible results, and myopic policies by regional 
and global powers further enhance radicalization and the 
influence of violent extremist forces. In some contexts, 
some issues are more important than others hence the 
need to locate the problem in a long and complex 
process of interaction between multiple drivers. 
In many countries of the sub-region the crisis of the 
state, the failure of secular and moderate forces to deliver 
credible results could provide a fertile ground for youth 
radicalization. But other internal and external actors need 
to be met before this translates to violent extremism. 
In fact, in most cases socio economic problems may 
not be used by leaders of terrorist groups as a major 
weapon for recruitment. Nevertheless, it may still remain 
the case that drives the youth to join radical and terrorist 
groups. So there seems to be a gap between the official 
statements and manifestos of terrorist organizations and 
the drivers of youth recruitment. This partly explains the 
weakness of terrorist organizations and the minority of 
their core membership. It may also explain why extremist 
groups are poor at governing. This is however changing 
with time. However, without such organizations and their 
leadership, radicalization cannot be turned into violent 
extremism or terrorism. In order for this to happen there 
should be organizations that can frame and channel the 
relevant grievances in violent directions. 
4. PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION 
According to Precht (2007), in Western Europe, for 
many, the process of radicalization begins when they are 
teenagers looking for a cause and a stronger identity and 
increasingly finding the answer in the ideology of radical 
groups. Often people are rather secular before they enter 
the radicalization process and, in general, radicalization is 
taking place within loose social networks of friends and 
peers (Precht, 2007). An important factor in radicalization 
is the presence of a charismatic person who can easily 
deliver persuasive speeches not only in Mosques but also 
in schools, universities, or even prisons. 
Official sources indicate that many American homegrown  
Islamists have also been radicalized while incarcerated, 
including the members of the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-
Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its plans 
to attack not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in 
Los Angeles. (Benraad, 2009) 
Many of young potential radicals are not fully aware 
of their country’s history, as well, they lack proper 
knowledge of Islam and have not read the Quran to see 
that Islam is actually one of the more peaceful religions. 
The fact that preachers of Wahhabi Islam find to their 
advantage is that many young disenchanted individuals 
are not knowledgeable about the entire scope of religion 
they are trying to embrace. 
Another important factor to consider is the role of 
social networks in the process of radicalization. “Social 
links are key to the dynamics of terror networks” 
(Sageman, 2004). Group phenomenon is a strong factor in 
creating such network, because the potential jihadists were 
close friends or relatives when joining terrorist network 
and have done so not individually but as a group. Many 
youth enter the circles of radicals after the society rejected 
them by finding virtual networks online, or in youth 
clubs and places of worship. The local community, by 
remaining disinterested in its youth, misses the cues that 
indicate the process of radicalization, as was the case with 
the Millennial Plot bombers in Montreal. Having been 
seen as “a bunch of guys” involved in petty crimes, living 
in an apartment on welfare, they were not taken seriously 
by the authorities, although their circle revolved around 
Kamel, who undergone military training and fought 
jihad in Bosnia (Sageman, 2004). Perhaps, this lapse 
in judgment was due to the same British multicultural 
approach that Canada has adopted to its immigration 
policies. However, the process of radicalization apart 
from social isolation also involves the desire to affect 
political change. Krueger (2007) posits that terrorism is 
akin to voting. High opportunity cost of time, such as 
high paying job, should discourage people from voting, 
but on the contrary, it is precisely them who vote, because 
they care about influencing the outcome and consider 
themselves sufficiently informed to express their opinions 
(Krueger, 2007). Terrorists also care about influencing 
political outcomes: they care about a cause so deeply that 
they are willing to die for it. Terrorists are responding 
to geopolitical issues, and understanding the causes 
of terrorism can help prevent countries from pursuing 
counterproductive courses of action (Krueger, 2007). 
4.1 Discussion
The political marginalisation or perceived marginalisation 
of ethnic or religious groups is believed to increase the 
risk of youth radicalization and violent extremism. In 
Nigeria, the marginalization of the minorities ethnic 
groups especially the Niger Delta is frequently identified 
as a cause of youth militancy in the region.
There are certainly cases of extremist groups using 
political exclusion as justification for violence like the 
case of Ibos in Nigeria. But, equally, terrorist organisations 
can emerge and flourish in highly democratic countries 
(as with left-wing terrorism in Germany in the 1970s, 
the Provisional IRAin the UK, and ETA in Spain). Some 
research distinguishes transnational from domestic 
terrorism, and source countries from target countries.
 Poor governance has long been assumed to be a driver for 
violent extremism. The underlying logic is that democratic 
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institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful 
reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for 
participation in policymaking, can help to address those 
underlying conditions that have fuelled the recent rise of youth 
radicalization. (Windsor, 2003, p.43)
Schmid (2006) argues that state weakness provides 
opportunities for revolt, while excessive strength and 
abuse of state power can foster resistance, providing 
opportunities for terrorist groups. He proposes two reasons 
for this: When unpopular rulers cannot be voted away in 
democratic procedures, advocates of political violence 
find a wide audience; when long-standing injustices in 
society are not resolved, desperate people are willing to 
die and to kill for causes they—and often also others—
perceive as just. Schmid’s thesis is intuitive, and some 
econometric studies such as Krueger and Laitin (2008), 
and Li (2005) show an inverse relationship between 
civil liberties and terrorism. Dowd and Lind (2015), in 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa, suggest that contemporary 
violence stems from historical grievances about the state’s 
failure over time to address deeply-rooted marginalisation 
and insecurity, while its use of repressive machinery to 
respond to insurgencies causes violence to recur. Others, 
however, disagree. 
Freeman (2008) finds a more complex relationship 
between political participation and violence, Chenoweth 
(2010) finds that terrorist activity is actually more 
prevalent in democracies, and Dalacoura’s (2006) 
analysis of Islamist terrorist groups across the Middle 
East shows that political exclusion and repression of 
Islamist movements contributed to the adoption of 
terrorist methods in some cases, but not in others. Several 
studies suggest that states which are partly free, or are 
in transition from authoritarianism to democracy are 
particularly vulnerable to violent extremism (e.g. Abadie, 
2004). Newman (2007) argues that weak or failed states 
might provide an enabling environment for certain types 
of terrorist groups to operate. This is not a sufficient 
explanation as terrorist groups have also emerged from, 
and operated within countries which have strong, stable 
states and a variety of systems of government.
4.2 Implication of Youth Radicalisation to the 
Future of Terrorism in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, there are numerous problems affecting the 
country. These issues range from weak legal regime, 
exclusion, political intolerance, marginalization, poverty, 
restiveness and youth bulge coupled with joblessness as 
well as crisis of national identity. When young people 
are not firmly rooted in a sense of nation, they are more 
likely to be persuaded by foreign extremists who invoke 
transnational and radical ideals. Similarly, homegrown 
radicalization is more likely to surface along ethnic, clan, 
or communal lines when a strong sense of nation is absent 
from the national consciousness. These factors provide 
ready and already hopeless pool from which terror 
networks recruit followers. The threat from Boko haram 
and other Militants groups in the country to Nigeria’s 
political and territorial integrity is therefore not a threat 
that Nigeria can choose to ignore.
In the wake of the present situation in the country, 
radicalization will increase in the country in the nearest 
future as many youths see this as their opportunity to 
shine and to belong and to make a difference. 
In light of these developments, Government should 
foster healthy nationalism through civic education, 
cultural events, and other activities that strengthen 
national solidarity. People being radicalized are noted 
to have been motivated by a desire to combat injustice, 
impunity, and corruption. The intelligence community 
in the country should cooperate fully with other 
security agencies both public and private as well as 
with the local populations in order to slow down the 
process of radicalization. Unfortunately, bureaucratic 
processes and the goals  of  various intel l igence 
agencies do not allow for swift reorganization of various 
agencies and their increased cooperation with local 
communities, thus leaving open the dilemma of youth 
radicalization. Since the radicalization of youth in the 
country will only tend to increase in the nearest future, 
based on the multitude of factors, closer cooperation 
between various law enforcement and counter-terrorism 
agencies is vital. The Arab spring, as well as the current 
economic crisis has made a lot of young people in 
the country anxious and looking for ways to engage 
meaningfully in the “struggle for justice” and thus has put 
more pressure on counter-terrorism policy in the country. 
It is important in this struggle for de-radicalization 
of youth to engage the local community to its fullest 
potential, as teachers, coaches and parents are missing 
the early cues of radicalization process. As a society of 
isolated individuals concerned with accumulation of 
wealth in Nigeria is missing the link with their dissatisfied 
young population that is spending increasingly more time 
online and less in the community. The need to combat 
online radicalization, as well as local charismatic radical 
Islamists is placed on the shoulders of law enforcement, 
but the community has to share the burden if it is to be 
successful in this battle. Communication between all 
levels of governments and community is essential for the 
achievement of de-radicalization. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION 
Nigerian Governments and the society at large must 
recognize the threat posed by radicalization in its various 
forms. While currently a great deal of attention is focused 
on Islamic radicalization in the region, due to the global 
war on terrorism, there is also need to recognize other 
more local forms of radicalization that may either 
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increasingly pose challenges on their own or form 
alliances with Islamic radicalism or camouflage within 
such radicalizations. 
In addition, it is essential to remember that poor 
people care about surviving and putting food on the 
table, they prioritize material gains, not politics. Hence, 
through dialogue with communities, the government 
should undertake genuine reforms aimed at creating 
socio-economic and political institutions with which 
citizens can empower themselves so as to identify and 
reject endeavors towards radicalizations and the issues 
emanating from it. In this regard, there is the need to 
address seriously the plight of the youth, especially as 
it relates to unemployment, since they form easy targets 
for recruitment, posing a dangerous challenge because of 
the youth population bulge that exists in all the African 
countries, included Nigeria. 
Also, there should be a partnership between the 
police and the community. Community may act as an 
early warning system for the police and intelligence 
services; it can also work upstream to prevent young 
people from radicalization, by diverting them from 
extremist propaganda, helping to deal with personal crisis 
and social exclusion; it can tackle the grievances; and 
the communication with police should be consensual, 
to maintain the trust in the relationship (Briggs, 2010). 
The major problem in Nigeria is that many community 
members don’t trust the police. They still feel alienated 
because they don’t feel that their views are valued by 
local authorities or that their involvement will make any 
difference. 
Both government and the wider society need to 
recognize the power of information technology and 
globalization. Since the region cannot wish away 
their influence, creative ways need to be explored in 
utilizing the same to respond to the current challenges of 
radicalization. Still on technology, and information, there 
is need to harmonize regional legal and enforcement 
systems as well as improve information exchange and 
other joint strategies to combat cross-border security 
challenges like terrorism and terrorist networks. 
Additionally, of importance is the need to reform 
the judicial and the law enforcement systems in the 
country to ensure the adoption of necessary counter-
terrorism legislation and practices. This includes both 
international laws and domestic laws. 
In conclusion, although generally violent extremists 
adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ 
to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar. Radical 
organizations understand and prey upon a combination 
of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and 
individual characteristics that render youth vulnerable 
to recruitment. A primary goal of preventing youth 
radicalization into terrorism is to promote understanding 
of the drivers of youth radicalization, identify Africa’s 
resiliencies and coping mechanisms to these drivers, and 
to generate policy recommendations aimed at mitigating 
the drivers. This is possible, though requires time, resources 
and application of relative cross-section expertise. 
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